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Abstract 
 
Background: According to cognitive vulnerability stress models of depression, negative 
cognitions are supposed to be stable characteristics of depressed individuals even between 
depressive episodes. Depressed people also interpret social information more negatively than 
healthy people, perhaps even between depressive episodes. Frequency of social comparison 
processes is correlated with low self-esteem and uncertainty, which is common in depression. 
Questions: Do people with lifetime depressive episodes engage in social comparisons more 
often and do they react more negatively to an upward comparison than normal controls? And 
if they do, is this just due to current depressive symptoms?  
Method: A questionnaire including the BDI II was administered as an internet link to all 
students or employees of a large University. 913 participants responded. After assessing 
social comparison orientation we used an upward comparison paradigm by asking the 
participants to compare themselves with a better-off person on several dimensions. Finally 
lifetime and current depressive symptoms were assessed.  
Results: Depressed persons engage in social comparison processes more often than normal 
controls. Positive affect decreased in the whole sample as a reaction of the upward 
comparison. This effect was stronger among persons with at least one depressive episode in 
the past or presence, and this was not due to current depression.  
Conclusion: Depressed persons engage more often in social comparison processes and they 
additionally react more negatively to upward comparisons than healthy controls. The result 
that even those not currently depressed with lifetime depressive episodes show a similar 
negative reaction to an upward comparison indicates that social comparisons are situations 
that interact with a stable cognitive vulnerability leading to negative affect and stronger 
negative reactions. 
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Affective disorders, especially depression, are one of the most common mental disorders 
with a lifetime prevalence of about 16% (Kessler et al., 1994). Depression is also highly 
recurrent, over 75% of the patients experience more than one depressive episode (Keller & 
Boland, 1998). Perhaps there are specific factors which lead to an increased risk for 
developing repeated episodes of this disorder. Besides the research on biological, genetic or 
environmental factors, research on psychological - especially cognitive and interpersonal risk 
factors - has a long tradition. Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (1967, 1976) and 
Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy’s (1989) hopelessness theory of depression were the most 
influential theories in this field of research on cognitive vulnerability. Many studies support 
their hypotheses that there exists an interaction between cognitive vulnerability and stress that 
culminates in depressive symptoms. These studies also suggest that dysfunctional cognitions 
are not only a symptom of current depression; they seem to be trait-like and persist beyond 
the remission of a current episode. Several recent prospective studies showed that individuals 
with such a cognitive vulnerability exhibit depressive symptoms when they experience 
negative life events (e.g. Alloy & Abramson, 1999; Alloy et al., 2000; Hankin, Abramson, & 
Siler, 2001; Reilly-Harrington, Alloy, Fresco, & Withehouse, 1999). In summary, there exists 
broad evidence for the validity of cognitive vulnerability stress models of depression. One 
possible negative event that could activate dysfunctional cognitions is social comparison that 
is ubiquitous and almost inevitable in everyday life (e.g. Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). 
Festinger (1954) hypothesized in his original theory of social comparison that individuals 
have a drive to evaluate their opinions and abilities. To function effectively, they need to 
appraise their abilities and to find out whether their opinions are accurate. Festinger thought 
that people best serve this need for self-evaluation against objective standards, but when such 
standards are unavailable, they compare themselves with other people. He hypothesized that 
people, for reasons of diagnosticity, prefer to compare themselves with other people who are 
 4 
similar to themselves on the focal dimension. Although Festinger discussed social comparison 
processes only involving opinions and abilities, researchers have studied social comparisons 
involving all types of personal attributes, such as physical attractiveness, personality 
characteristics, or emotions (Wood & Lockwood, 1999).  
Recently, Gibbons and Buunk (1999) proposed the concept of social comparison 
orientation to refer to the personality disposition of individuals who are strongly oriented to 
social comparison, for example who are strongly interested in their own standing relative to 
others. Social comparison orientation is positively correlated to variables such as neuroticism, 
social anxiety, and self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, Buss, 1975) and negatively to 
self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). People with a strong social comparison orientation seem to be 
more interpersonally than introspectively oriented, more sensitive to the behaviour of others, 
and they experience a degree of uncertainty about the self, along with an interest in reducing 
this self-uncertainty (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). A series of experiments showed that a strong 
social comparison orientation is associated with interest in receiving information for example 
about the test scores of others after having performed a test. It also showed that those high in 
comparison orientation were more affected by social comparisons (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
There is reason to believe that social comparison processes could be central in people 
who are depressed. First, a major characteristic of depression (Beck, 1967) is a negative self-
view, and peoples’ self-evaluations are believed to be based in part on social comparison 
processes. Second, many studies showed that comparisons with others who are better off in 
some way – upward comparisons – can lower one’s mood and self-esteem (Ahrens & Alloy, 
1997; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991; 
Morse & Gergen, 1970). Third, depressed individuals have been shown to be more interested 
in and sensitive to social comparison information (Ahrens & Alloy, 1997; Swallow & Kuiper, 
1990). Not surprisingly there is evidence that depressed individuals interpret social 
comparison information in a less self-serving way than non-depressed individuals do, and that 
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they tend to focus especially on the fact that others are better off than they are (e.g. Swallow 
& Kuiper, 1993; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992).  
In summary one can postulate that current depression is associated with stronger negative 
reactions to upward comparisons. The question, however, remains if this is also true for 
people at risk for depression. Based on cognitive vulnerability-stress-models (e.g. Abramson 
et al., 1989; Beck, 1976) such situations in which upward social comparisons can take place 
are potentially self-threatening and could interact with the vulnerability and therefore affect 
current mood and self-esteem. If this is the case it is expected that not just current depression 
but also a lifetime history of depressive episodes (i.e. vulnerability) will be associated with 
stronger negative reactions when comparing oneself with someone who seems to be better off 
on commonly important dimensions (e.g., more successful, more attractive or more liked).  
More precisely, we expect a decrease in positive affect in the whole sample as a reaction 
to the upward comparison, and this decrease should be stronger for for individuals with 
current depressive symptoms and those with a lifetime history of depression, i.e. going 
beyond the effect of current depression. Additionally we examine if this association is 
moderated by interindividual differences in social comparison orientation (e.g. Buunk & 
Brenninkmeijer, 2001; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
 
METHOD 
Participants. In summer 2003 an email was sent to about 16.000 students and employees of 
a large German University. This email also contained an internet link with the questionnaires. 
Nine-hundred-thirteen persons completed the questionnaire. The mean age was M = 29.45 
(SD = 9.17) with a range between 17 and 69. Four-hundred-forty-nine were women (54.7%), 
394 men (43.2%), 20 did not provide the information about their sex (2.2%). The sample is 
nearly completely academic with 531 (58%) having had attended school for 13 years 
(secondary school final exam) and additionally 301 (33%) with a university education, 36 
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(4%) had 10 years of education (O-level), six (1%) had 9 years of education (CSE), four 
(0,5%) had not finished any school and thirty five (4%) did not mention their attained 
educational status. Five-hundred-eleven were students, 268 employees, 43 civil servants, 29 
self-employed, 20 trainees, 10 unemployed 1, eight non-professionals and 24 did not mention 
their profession. Most of the respondents were single (n = 698, 76.5%), 146 married (16%), 
20 were divorced, eleven were divorced and remarried, eleven had a registered gay partner 
and two were widowed.  
Materials 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann & Tausch, 
1996). This is a validated translation of the original form from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 
(1988). The PANAS is a widely used affect rating scale that includes 10 adjectives to assess 
positive affect (PA) and 10 adjectives to assess negative affect (NA). Each item is rated using 
a 5-point rating scale. Cronbach’s alphas are comparable for the English and German 
versions, varying for PA between .85 and .90 and for NA between .84 and .87 (Krohne et al., 
1996; Watson et al., 1988), and factor analytic results support the statistical independence of 
the positive and negative affect dimensions (e.g. Krohne et al., 1996; Schmukle, Egloff & 
Burns, 2002; Terraciano, McCrae & Costa, 2003). The Cronbach's alphas in the present 
sample were .86 for both PA and NA.  
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM, Gibbons &Buunk, 1999). 
This 11-item scale consists of statements reflecting social comparison activities and interests 
to measure social comparison orientation. Sample items are: “I often compare myself with 
others with respect to what I have accomplished in life” and “If I want to learn more about 
something, I try to find out what others think about it”. The items were measured on a 5-point 
rating scale. The INCOM does not correlate with social desirability, and has a test-retest-
reliability over 8 months of .72 (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). The coefficient alpha of the 
German version of the INCOM in the present sample was .85. 
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Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI II, Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The revised BDI 
measures the severity of self-reported depression but is also used for screening purposes (e.g. 
Kumar, Steer, & Teitelman, 2002). The 21 item BDI II is scored by summing the highest 
ratings for each of the 21 symptoms, and each symptom is rated on a 4-point rating scale 
ranging from 0 to 3. Total scores can range from 0 to 63. In contrast to the original BDI the 
time frame for the BDI II is the “past 2 weeks, including today”. The coefficient alpha of the 
German version of the BDI II (Hautzinger, Kühner et al., in preparation) in the present sample 
was .91 and is comparable to the scores reported by others (e.g. Beck et al., 1996; Kumar et 
al., 2002). The mean score for this sample was 8.29 (SD = 8.13, range 0 – 54). 
Depression Screening Questionnaire (DSQ,Wittchen & Perkonig, 1997). The DSQ 
originally consists of 15 questions screening major depressive disorder and can be used in 
combination with an interview. The questions of the DSQ asking for specific symptoms of 
depression focus on a two-week period (Wittchen & Pfister, 1997). Retest-reliability varied 
between .68 and .92 in different samples and the authors report that the validity for a 
diagnosis of major depression is high (.76; Wittchen & Pfister, 1997). In the version used for 
this internet based study nine items covered all criteria of the DSM IV for a major depressive 
episode. The original 3-point scale was also modified. Each question was rated on a 4-point 
scale and the response format was “yes”, “rather yes”, “rather no” and “no”. To save time and 
space two questions about increased and decreased appetite were integrated to one question, 
also two questions about increased and decreased motor activity. Questions about frequency, 
duration and course of depressive episodes were modified to assess former and not current 
depression. Internal consistency for the DSQ was sufficient in the present study with α = .81. 
To determine if someone has a lifetime history of major depression, we only counted definite 
“yes”-answers. In addition to this sum score, a lifetime history of major depression was coded 
following the rules of the DSM IV, if the DSQ sum score was 5 and above and included either 
“depressed mood” or “anhedonia/loss of interest”. 
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Procedure 
The first section of the questionnaire included demographic variables as well as the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Krohne et al., 1996; Watson et al., 1988) to 
assess positive and negative affect. In addition the social comparison orientation was assessed 
with the Iowa-Netherlands-Comparison-Orientation-Measure (INCOM, Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999). The participants were then asked to imagine a friend or acquaintance of the same age 
and gender, “who attains nearly always what he/she wants in his/her job or his/her studies. 
The person has a good working relationship for some time. He/she gets to know new friends 
easily and is able to mostly realise his/her interests during his/her leisure /free time”. Five 
questions followed so that participants compared themselves with this person in several 
dimensions. Then mood was assessed again using the PANAS. Additionally current and 
lifetime depressive episodes were assessed with the Beck’s depression inventory (BDI II, 
Beck et al., 1996) and the depression screening questionnaire (DSQ, Wittchen & Perkonig, 
1997). 
Statistical analyses 
As a manipulation check, we tested if positive and negative affect were influenced in the 
total sample due to the upward comparison. To test our main hypotheses we used multiple 
regression analyses with changes in affect as dependent variable. First we examined if the 
social comparison orientation and current depression are significant predictors, as expected. 
Then we additionally included former depression to examine if a history of depression 
explains variance of change in affect beyond that of current depression. Finally, we examined 
if a history of depression predicts the emotional reaction to the upward social comparison in 
people who are currently not reporting any depressive symptoms. We included only cases 
without any missing data (N = 704) in our regression analyses. Probably because of the length 
of the questionnaire, we had some non-completers among our participants, which can at least 
partly explain the drop-out-rate of 209.There were no statistical differences between the two 
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groups with or without missing data, neither in age nor in BDI-, DSQ-, INCOM- and 
PANAS-scores (t < 1.14, n.s.). The only significant difference was in gender with women 
having more missing data than men (23.6% vs. 18%, χ² = 4.18, p < .05, n = 893). 
 
RESULTS 
To get an idea about the prevalence rates, 218 (23.9%) of the total sample (including 
those with missing values in single measures) have probably had a depressive episode in the 
past, whereas 111 (12%) are likely to be currently depressed. If one only takes into account 
those without missing data, the equivalent prevalence rates is identical with 23.9 % for 
lifetime depression but slightly higher for current depression with 19.5 %. The descriptive 
statistics for the latter two groups without any missing data are displayed in Table 1 and 2.  
Manipulation checks 
The manipulation was partly successful. As expected, positive affect decreased in the 
whole sample as a reaction to the upward comparison (t (845) = 4.74; p< .001). Surprisingly 
the negative affect decreased (t (848) = 10.62; p< .001).  
Major findings 
There was a significant correlation between current depressive symptoms and social 
comparison orientation (Pearson r = .25; p<.001), indicating that higher BDI-scores are 
associated with higher INCOM-scores. 
A stepwise multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses that 
social comparison orientation and current depression predict changes in affect. The change of 
mood was the dependent variable and INCOM and BDI were the independent variables. 
INCOM had no significant influence, but the BDI had (see Table 3). To test the influence of 
former depressive episodes a second regression analysis with the three independent variables 
INCOM, DSQ and BDI was conducted, which produced a significant effect for the BDI, 
while DSQ and INCOM remained not significant.  
 10 
Because BDI and DSQ scores were correlated (r = .35, p < .01, n = 798) we ran a further 
analyses to check  if a history of depression predicts the emotional reaction to the upward 
social comparison in people who are currently reporting low levels of depressive symptoms. 
According to Beck et al. (1996) this is indicated by BDI-II scores < 13. This regression 
analysis was conducted with the two independent variables INCOM and DSQ but only for 
participants who were not likely to have a current episode of major depression (BDI score < 
13). The DSQ had a significant influence on mood change. Results of the regression analyses 
are again displayed in Table 3. 
We also conducted linear regression analyses for negative affect as well, but there were 
only two effects on change in negative affect. If only INCOM and DSQ were used as 
predictors in people with low depression (BDI < 13), INCOM was associated with a stronger 
decrease in negative affect (R = .09, R2 = .01, F (1, 565) = 4.21, p < .05). If  INCOM, BDI and  
DSQ were all three used as predictors in this group of people with low level of depression, 
only BDI remained a significant predictor. The lower the level of depressive symptoms, the 
less change was observed in negative affect (R = .12, R2 = .01, F (1, 565) = 7.75, p < .01). 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Based on prior research we predicted a decrease in positive affect in the whole sample as 
a reaction to the upward comparison, and this decrease was expected to be stronger for 
participants high in social comparison orientation and also for individuals with current 
depressive symptoms. Furthermore we were interested if a lifetime history of depressive 
episodes affects the reaction to an upward comparison, even beyond the effect of current 
depressive symptoms. The reasoning for this was that such upward comparisons might 
activate negative cognitions and lead to changes in affect as cognitive vulnerability stress 
models would predict (e.g. Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1967). These hypotheses were partly 
confirmed. The upward comparison induced a change in positive affect, and participants with 
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current depressive symptoms demonstrated a greater change in positive affect than 
participants without current depressive symptoms. Even participants with current low 
depression but with former depressive episodes experienced a greater change in mood than 
participants without depressive episodes in the past. Social comparison orientation did, 
however, not have an influence on positive affect but was associated with more decrease in 
negative affect.  
In line with findings of earlier studies (e.g. Brewer & Weber, 1994; Heidrich & Ryff, 
1993; Lyobomirsky & Ross, 1997; Weary, Elbin, & Hill, 1987; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992), 
the present research shows again the negative effect of an upward comparison, at least if one 
looks at the decrease in positive affect. Swallow and Kuiper (1988) proposed a link between 
social comparison processes and depression such that the negative self-concept of depressives 
is at least partly based on such social comparisons (Swallow & Kuiper, 1988). The results of 
this study show that people reporting current symptoms of depression report a stronger 
orientation towards social comparisons than non-depressed individuals. These social 
comparisons and the way they are interpreted might be one way in which their negative self-
concept and depressed mood is maintained and reinforced.  
Of more interest, however, is the finding that people who are currently not depressed but 
report a lifetime history of depression also showed a reaction to upward social comparison 
similar to that of people who are currently depressed. This is in line with the hypothesis of 
cognitive vulnerability stress models that describe negative cognitions such as dysfunctional 
attitudes (Beck, 1967) or a depressogenic attributional style (Abramson et al., 1989) as stable 
characteristics which represent vulnerability for a depressive episode.  
In line with former studies in which social comparison orientation moderated the effect of 
comparison information in so far as individuals high in comparison orientation showed a 
stronger affective response to upward comparisons (Buunk & Brenninkmeijer, 2001; Buunk, 
Oldersma & De Dreu, 2001; Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons & Ipenburg, 2001), but this was only 
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true for negative affect in people who reported fairly low levels of depression, i.e. BDI-II 
scores < 13 indicating only minimal symptoms according to Beck et al. (1996). The decrease 
in negative affect associated with higher social comparison orientation implies that the person 
described in the upward comparison did not result in a threat to self-esteem. However, BDI- 
and INCOM-scores were correlated (r = .25, p < .01, n = 774). Perhaps more important than 
interindividual differences in social comparison orientation themselves are interindividual 
differences in current depression which might mediate this effect.  
Before drawing final conclusions one should keep the following limitations in mind. 
First, contrary to expectations negative affect decreased and was not consistently influenced 
by current or former depression. Only positive affect confirmed expectations, and here the 
decreases in positive affect were associated with depression. Perhaps it is easier to induce a 
decrease in positive affect than inducing an increase in negative affect. However, if one takes 
into account the baseline score of the negative affect and compares it with other studies (e.g. 
Krohne et al., 1996), it seems more likely that this drop in negative affect scores is due to 
regression-to-the mean.  Second, the variance explained by our variables is small. We assume 
that this is partly due to the design of the study. On one hand the internet provided us with a 
sample size that included enough people with probable current and former depression, but on 
the other hand there was no experimental control over such things as how long it took people 
to complete the questionnaire (e.g. being interrupted by a phone call) or choice of comparison 
target. Even more problematic is that not much is known about the self-selection bias that 
might be associated with participating in an internet study or not and the fact that only 913 
participated out of 16,000 originally circulated highlights this problem. Furthermore the 
design of the study only allowed for the use of self-report questionnaires that cannot replace 
structured clinical interviews, especially regarding the diagnoses of current or former episodes 
of major depression.  
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Conclusions: Despite the limitations, it seems interesting to further pursue the idea that 
former depression might be an indicator of something that moderates the effects on cognition 
and emotion of upward social comparisons. Perhaps a cycle starts where negative mood after 
such social comparison triggers the need for further social comparisons, resulting in more and 
more negative self-evaluations. Furthermore it would be interesting to clarify if such a history 
of lifetime depression has to be seen as a scar or if it is reflecting the effect of cognitive 
vulnerability factors such as dysfunctional attitudes or attributional styles prior to the previous 
episode.  
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Foot note 
 
1
 It might seem surprising that people mentioned ‘unemployed’ but this can happen because 
former students or employees might keep their email account for some time after having left 
the university.
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Table 1:  
Descriptive statistics for the two groups “current clinical depressive symptoms” vs. “low current 
depression”  
 BDI ≤ 13 BDI >13 
 N M SD   N M SD 
Gender 
  Male 
  Female 
567 
278 
289 
  137 
45 
92 
  
Age 567 29,75 8,85 137 27,29 8,33 
BDI 567 5.02 3.90 137 21.82 7.42 
DSQ 567 2.18 2.34 137 3.92 2.58 
INCOM 567 36.95 8.09 137 40.71 8.06 
PA-PRE 567 28.72 6.94 137 24.12 6.09 
PA-POST 567 28.49 7.00 137 23.58 6.03 
NA-PRE 567 14.17 4.80 137 20.93 7.71 
NA-POST 567 12.83 4.08 137 19.45 8.72 
Difference PA  567 -0.23 1.84 137 -0.55 2.01 
Difference NA  567 -1.34 3.10 137 -1.49 5.40 
 
Note: Only cases with no missing data at all were included (n = 704). BDI: Becks Depressions 
Inventory II; DSQ: Depressions-Screening Questionnaire; INCOM: Iowa-Netherlands Comparison 
Orientation Questionnaire; PA-PRE: positive affect at first measuring time; PA-POST: positive affect 
at second measuring time; NA-PRE: negative affect at first measuring time; NA-POST: negative 
affect at second measuring; Difference PA: PA-Post minus PA-Pre; Difference NA: NA-Post minus 
NA-Pre 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the persons with “probably a lifetime depressive episode” vs. 
those “probably without any lifetime depressive episode” 
 
 DSQ < 5  DSQ ≥ 5 
 N M SD N M SD 
Gender 
  Male 
  Female 
536 
271 
265 
  
168 
52 
116 
  
Age 536 28,97 8,64 168 30,32 9,24 
BDI 536 7.11 6.82 168 12.06 10.72 
DSQ 536 1.37 1.44 168 6.18 1.24 
INCOM 536 37.27 8.11 168 39.00 8.44 
PA-PRE 536 27.94 6.78 168 27.45 7.72 
PA-POST 536 27.75 6.80 168 26.86 7.82 
NA-PRE 536 15.01 5.64 168 16.99 7.18 
NA-POST 536 13.58 5.05 168 15.83 7.86 
Note: Only cases with no missing data at all were included (n = 704). BDI: Becks Depressions 
Inventory II; DSQ: Depressions-Screening Questionnaire; INCOM: Iowa-Netherlands Comparison 
Orientation Questionnaire; PA-PRE: positive affect at first measuring time; PA-POST: positive affect 
at second measuring time; NA-PRE: negative affect at first measuring time; NA-POST: negative 
affect at second measuring 
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Table 3: Results of the regression analyses with change in positive affect as dependent 
variables   
1) INCOM and BDI as independent variables (N = 704) 
 R R² β  Significance  
INCOM - - -.04 n.s. 
BDI .10 .01 .10 .008 
 
2) INCOM, BDI and DSQ as independent variables (N = 704) 
 R R² β Significance 
INCOM - - -.04 n.s. 
DSQ - - .06 n.s. 
BDI .10 .01 .10 .008 
 
3) INCOM and DSQ as independent variables for participants with low current depression 
only (N = 567) 
 R R² β Significance 
INCOM - - -.02 n.s. 
DSQ .09 .01 .09 .026 
  
4) INCOM, BDI and DSQ as independent variables for participants with low current 
depression only (N = 567) 
 R R² β Significance 
INCOM   - - -.02 n.s. 
DSQ .09 .01 .09 .026 
BDI - - .06 n.s. 
Note: BDI: Becks Depressions Inventory II; DSQ: Depressions-Screening Questionnaire (indicating a 
history of depression); INCOM: Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Questionnaire. 
 
 
